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PROCESS MATTERS: SPECIALIZATION IN
FEDERAL APPELLATE REVIEW OF
NONCAPITAL SECTION 2254 CASES
JYOTI RANI JINDAL†
ABSTRACT
This Note assesses the need for specialized review in the federal
circuit courts of noncapital habeas cases brought by state prisoners
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It first argues that the complexity of federal
habeas law, the substantial disuniformity between circuits, the
conflicting visions proffered by the Warren Court’s habeas
jurisprudence and Congress’s recent statutory enactments—together
with the greatest stakes possible at issue, liberty—are all factors
warranting the creation of a national court of appeals that would hear
only habeas cases. Recognizing, however, that creating such a court is
a low priority for Congress at best and simply unfeasible at worst, this
Note also makes another recommendation for injecting specialized
review into appellate adjudication. Specifically, the circuit courts’ use
of line staff attorneys to screen petitions can be much improved by
creating a career staff attorney position dedicated solely to review of
noncapital § 2254 cases. A formal position will attract better
candidates, have lower rates of turnover, and concentrate experience
and expertise to the benefit of judges and litigants.

INTRODUCTION
In response to the recent statutory and judge-made restrictions
1
on federal habeas review, scholars have suggested widely diverging
proposals for its reformation. Some have advocated for process
reforms, such as creating a constitutional right to counsel in
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1. For a brief history of the Great Writ, see infra Part I.A.1.
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postconviction proceedings or a national court of appeals for the
direct review of all federal- and state-court convictions that would
3
lessen the pressure on collateral relief. Others have advanced
proposals for replacing current law and starting anew with more
4
focused legislation or approaching the writ from a different
5
perspective. Two scholars have proposed eliminating federal habeas
review for all but two categories of noncapital cases, arguing that
because the chances of success are so low for these claimants, it is
more useful to devote these resources to ensuring fair process at the
6
state level.
Few scholars, however, have looked at the mechanisms by which
federal courts process and decide habeas claims as a means to ensure
7
greater accuracy and improve efficiency in their adjudication. This

2. See, e.g., Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The
Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal
Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219 (2012).
3. Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal
Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 598 (1974). Specifically, then-Chief Judge
Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit offered the following:
My own modest proposal is essentially abandonment of primary reliance upon
collateral review of federal questions arising in criminal prosecutions and the
substitution of an efficient system for prompt direct review . . . requir[ing] the
creation of a new national court of appeals to review convictions in the federal and
state judicial systems.
Id. (footnote omitted). His proposal was based largely on concerns stemming from the
burgeoning federal dockets and the changes wrought in the writ by the Supreme Court in the
previous decade. Id. at 597–98, 600–02.
4. See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign A Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 950–1040 (2000) (discussing how Congress can narrow the
scope of the writ by limiting the substantive claims to those underlying the purpose of federal
habeas review rather than by setting up procedural hurdles).
5. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 86 (2012) (arguing that the more important purpose of federal habeas
review of state-court convictions is “ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair,”
not overturning wrongful convictions).
6. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 819–821, 823–24 (2009). For one response to this argument, see
John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A
Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 435 (2011).
7. There has been some scholarship evaluating case-management practices in individual
federal district courts. See generally, e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts,
Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475
(2002) (reviewing the response by the Eastern District of New York to a rise in the number of
pro se claims); Kim Dayton, Case Management in the Eastern District of Virginia, 26 U.S.F. L.
REV. 445 (1992) (analyzing the value of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990).
Any discussion of the processing of habeas corpus claims by the federal courts of
appeals, however, has been in the context of evaluating their mechanisms for processing all
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Note seeks to explore this proposition in relation to noncapital
habeas claims brought by state prisoners in federal courts of appeals
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It focuses on federal review of noncapital
state convictions because these make up the majority of habeas
8
appeals. This Note also focuses on appellate review for three reasons.
First, the practices of the federal district courts are too varied for
9
suitable analysis and comparison. Second, as petitioners seeking to
file second or successive petitions must request certificates of
appealability from circuit courts—the grant or denial of which is not
10
reviewable on certiorari to the Supreme Court —the appellate courts
enjoy a special role, quite literally acting as guards to the courthouse
11
and to justice. Lastly, because the Supreme Court “grants certiorari
in only a fraction of the habeas cases entertained by the lower federal
courts,” the appellate courts are courts of last resort for many
12
litigants. Due to the heightened stakes—liberty, not mere property,
and the potential to correct decades-long injustices—it is particularly
important that they decide these cases accurately.

claims and has focused on the perceived inequities of these mechanisms. See, e.g., WILLIAM M.
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS IN CRISIS 4, 12, 103–04, 182 (2012) (discussing the role of the Warren Court’s
expansion of federal habeas review in increasing federal courts’ caseloads and leading to the
development of case-management practices, including limited publication, hiring of staff
attorneys, and denial of oral arguments, all of which have resulted in the “screen[ing] out of the
traditional process those cases that are the least likely to draw the attention of any powerful
observer,” including “habeas corpus cases”); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The
Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1444–64 (2004) (tracing
the origins of “unpublication” to “the federal judiciary’s anxiety about floods of civil rights and
pro se prisoner postconviction appeals litigation in the 1960s”). Recently, while responding to
critiques of federal appellate case-management practices, Professor Marin Levy suggested that
for some types of cases, staff attorney review, if specialized, could in fact be beneficial to
litigants. Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2410–11 (2014)
[hereinafter Levy, Judging Justice] (reviewing RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra); Marin K. Levy,
Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time
Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 443–44 (2013)
[hereinafter Levy, Judicial Attention].
8. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
9. Compare, e.g., Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 495–97, with Dayton, supra note 7,
at 466–69 (describing how the Eastern District of New York and the Eastern District of
Virginia, respectively, manage their pro se docket).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2012).
11. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996).
12. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 288
(2006).
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This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that noncapital
13
habeas claims are suitable for specialized review because the
substantive law of habeas corpus exhibits the characteristics that have
been used to justify specialized review in other areas of law. Part II
analyzes the advantages and drawbacks of one form that specialized
review can take—a specialized court, such as the United States Tax
Court or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, featuring
adjudication by expert judges. This Part closes by assessing the
feasibility of such a court, determining that due to political
differences, it is unlikely that such a court would ever be created by
Congress. As a result, the final Part presents an alternate form of
specialized review—review undertaken by staff attorneys with
subject-matter expertise in habeas law. It outlines a proposal to
structure such review and addresses arguments against such review.
This Note concludes that specialized review by staff attorneys can
ensure that habeas petitions receive the attention, time, and care they
deserve without overburdening the appellate court.
I. NONCAPITAL HABEAS CLAIMS ARE SUITABLE
FOR SPECIALIZED REVIEW
When the federal court system experiences an exponential
increase in caseload, scholars often respond by proposing specialized
courts with sole jurisdiction over particular types of cases or areas of
14
law. The burden placed on the federal courts’ dockets by habeas
15
petitions is well known and accounted for. This Part establishes that
there are additional factors that justify creating a specialized appeals

13. My use of this term is limited to the idea that at some point after a claim is filed, it is
evaluated by someone with expertise in habeas corpus. Thus it includes both specialized
processing mechanisms (the screening and reviewing of claims by expert staff attorneys) and
specialized adjudication (adjudication by expert judges).
14. See, e.g., Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 745
(1981) (suggesting a “trial-level specialist as an option in difficult cases”); Stephen J. Safranek,
Curbing the Fees of the Class Action Lawyers in Light of City of Burlington, 41 WAYNE L. REV.
1301, 1337–39 (1995) (proposing a specialized court to hear class-action cases). For an argument
against specialized appellate judges, see Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals
Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 761, 777–89 (1983).
15. See, e.g., infra notes 20–21, 91 (discussing “abuse” of the Great Writ); see also infra
notes 83–84 and accompanying text (reporting the percentage of the federal appeals courts’
caseload composed of § 2254 and § 2255 habeas petitions).
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court to hear only habeas petitions: (1) complexity; (2) a need for
16
uniformity and coherence; and (3) a special concern for accuracy.
A. Complexity
This Section begins with a brief history of the writ of habeas
corpus and introduces the various sources of law that govern it. It
then reviews the maze-like complexity that is the hallmark of modern
federal habeas law.
1. The History of the Great Writ. Much of the restrictive nature
of federal habeas review is recent. Though, historically, the Great
17
Writ of Liberty was only granted “sparingly,” Congress expanded it
18
in 1867 by permitting federal review of state-court convictions.
Access to the writ was expanded again in the 1950s and 1960s, this
19
time by the Supreme Court. Notably, both expansions came at a
time when there was danger of state courts under-enforcing federal
rights, first after the Civil War and then during the civil rights
movement.

16. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1116–17, 1120 (1990). Professor Richard Revesz provides a thorough
review of the literature that identifies complexity, uniformity, and coherence as factors justifying
specialized review. Id. at 1116–20. He also discusses two other reasons: the desire to remove
adjudicative functions from administrative agencies to specialized courts and the “sharp
increase in the volume of litigation” that occurred in the 1980s. Id. at 1118, 1120. The first
reason is “exclusive to the administrative context,” id. at 1115, and is consequently not included
here. Revesz’s second reason is less persuasive today in light of the recent decline in federal
appellate filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS—SUMMARY (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18451/download [http://perma.cc/
K4RC-APZA] (showing a declining trend in overall number of appellate filings since 2010 for
all circuits except for the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, which have seen filings increase by
2.1 and 1.2 percent, respectively); see also Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicialcaseload-statistics-2014 [https://perma.cc/5BCQ-4BW5] (reporting a 15 percent decline in total
appeals court filings since 2005).
17. Lynn Adelman, Federal Habeas Review of State Court Convictions: Incoherent Law But
an Essential Right, 64 ME. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus
and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 64–66 (2012) (noting that the Judiciary Act of 1789
“empowered all federal judges to grant the writ” and “provided for factual and legal review of
detention of federal prisoners”).
18. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 440 & n.23.
19. See id. at 440 & nn.24–28 (providing an overview of the Supreme Court decisions of
these two decades that “ushered in the modern era of federal habeas corpus,” and “set the highwater mark for habeas review of state court judgments”); Blume, supra note 12, at 262–63 &
nn.18–19 (noting the cases that prompted debate of habeas petitions).
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With the writ’s latest expansion, however, came a flood of
20
petitions. This flood promoted a perception that the writ was being
“abused,” as litigants sometimes waited years before filing a petition
21
or filed successive petitions attacking the same conviction. Soon
thereafter, the Court began rolling back these expansions, creating
procedural barriers to the writ itself and limiting the substantive
22
constitutional rights that formed the bases for claims. In 1995,
however, Congress still perceived abuse of the writ to be a significant
23
problem. Consequently, it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
24
25
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
AEDPA did far more than the Court had already done to restrict
federal habeas review, including imposing a one-year statute of
26
limitations and requiring federal courts to be deferential to the
27
findings and conclusions of state courts. Although both are
28
considered “major provisions” of AEDPA, the latter has drawn the
most attention. By requiring such deference AEDPA changed the

20. See Jane A. Gordon, Comment, Pleading Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Habeas
Corpus: Sua Sponte Departure from Precedent and Congressional Intent, 38 EMORY L.J. 489, 489
(1989) (“In the single decade between 1954 and 1963, the number of habeas corpus petitions
filed annually in federal court increased 352%, and by 1963 habeas corpus petitions comprised
3.3% of the total federal caseload.”). By 1976, it comprised 6 percent of the total federal
caseload. Id.
21. See id. at 489–90 (discussing Congress’s passage of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus
in 1976 and the purpose behind the enactment of rules 9(a), which addressed delayed petitions,
and 9(b), which addressed successive petitions, mainly, to curb these “abuse[s] of the writ”).
22. See Blume et al., supra note 6, at 440–41 (discussing, in brief, the limitations imposed
on federal habeas review of state-court convictions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts);
Blume, supra note 12, at 265–70 (providing a more detailed accounting of the cases that
reshaped federal habeas review).
23. Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process:
Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“This abuse of habeas corpus litigation,
particularly in those cases involving lawfully imposed death sentences, has seriously eroded the
public’s confidence in our criminal justice system, drained State criminal justice resources, and
taken a dreadful toll on victims’ families.”).
24. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2266 (2012)).
25. See Blume, supra note 12, at 259–60 (describing what the enactment of AEDPA meant
to its supporters).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).
27. See id. § 2254(d) (restricting the grant of habeas corpus only to state-court proceedings
that were contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established federal law” or
were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts”).
28. Adelman, supra note 17, at 384.
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nature of the relationship between federal and state courts,
undermining the very purpose of federal habeas review of state-court
30
convictions. Moreover, the Court’s interpretations of AEDPA’s
provisions have been largely restrictive, further narrowing federal
31
habeas review.
2. Resulting Complexity. An area of law can be complex because
32
the legal doctrines or statutes are intricate or simply numerous, or
33
because of the “technical nature of the facts.” The complexity in
modern federal habeas review is of the former nature. It derives from
many judge-made legal doctrines of federal and state origin that
interact with an intricate federal statutory scheme. The result,
34
according to some, is an “incoherent” body of law that produces
35
“mind-numbingly complicated and confusing litigation.”

29. E.g., Blume, supra note 12, at 260, 272 (referring to § 2254(d) as the “centerpiece” of
AEDPA and describing how it prevents federal courts from “overturning . . . the state court
apple cart”).
30. See Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 888, 946 (1998) (agreeing with then-Senator Biden’s comments on § 2254(d)
during a Senate debate that the provision was “directly contrary to the purpose of habeas
corpus” in that it prevented federal courts from “grant[ing] a claim that was adjudicated in State
court proceedings”). Justin Marceau argues that the more important purpose of federal habeas
review of state-court convictions is “ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair,”
not that it results in the overturning of wrongful convictions. See Marceau, supra note 5, at 86.
This purpose is also undermined by § 2254(d), however, as deference does not equate with a
critical review of the state-court process.
31. See Marceau, supra note 5, at 106–24 (detailing two 2011 Supreme Court cases that
narrowly interpret § 2254(d) to restrict access to habeas corpus); see also White v. Woodall, 134
S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (reasoning that “[s]ection 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in
which a state court unreasonably applies this Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts
to extend that precedent” even to contexts where the precedent should have controlled). But see
generally Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2071 (2014) (arguing that three recent cases point to a shift in the Supreme
Court’s focus from guilt/innocence to ensuring fair procedures which has the potential to
increase the chances of a successful habeas corpus claim). For an argument that the Court’s
restrictive interpretations of AEDPA result from its own institutional interests, see Aziz Z.
Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 52–63
(2015).
32. See Revesz, supra note 16, at 1117 & n.31 (“The classic example of a legally complex
field is tax law.”).
33. Id. at 1117–18 (offering patent law as an example).
34. Adelman, supra note 17, at 384.
35. Jordan Steiker, Opinion Analysis: Innocence Exception Survives, Innocence Claim Does
Not (Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (May 29, 2013, 11:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/
opinion-analysis-innocence-exception-survives-innocence-claim-does-not [http://perma.cc/J84HV85V].
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Federal habeas law has also been described as maze-like because
36
of its many procedural checkpoints; that overcoming these hurdles
requires familiarity with state and federal legal doctrines as well as
37
state and federal statutes only adds to the complexity. To describe
this complexity in another way, a single case may raise questions of
both federal and state law, require an understanding of the legal
doctrines at issue, and demand knowledge of which legal doctrines
are superseded by statute and which doctrines serve as exceptions to
the same statute—all before reaching the merits of the substantive
claims.
Because federal courts operate with limited judicial resources,
judicial efficiency is critical to ensuring that courts can meet the
38
obligations of a burgeoning caseload. Of course, efficiency must not
come at the expense of accuracy. Yet a trade-off between these goals
is unavoidable when a particular area of law features heightened
complexity: either too little time is being spent to fully develop or
understand the issues, or too much time is being spent at the expense
39
of other cases. Expertise can help resolve, or at least ease, this
40
tension because it ensures efficiency without diminishing accuracy.
36. Even prior to AEDPA’s passing, “[s]imply navigating through the procedural maze of
habeas practice . . . [was] a formidable task.” John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An
Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 271, 272 (1996).
37. See id. at 273 n.2 (describing the need to exhaust all claims in state court before
proceeding to federal court).
38. See James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the
United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 4 (noting that volume and diversity “demand
constant attention to efficiency, without which the caseload would burgeon beyond the
capability of any one judge to provide justice as is necessary in each case”).
39. Federal District Court Judge James Holderman wrote:
I do not have the luxury of spending the time to learn more about a specific area of
the law than necessary to resolve a particular case or a particular issue that may need
resolution. . . . Because of the constant press of the rest of our caseload, we often find
it difficult to devote the time that, in a perfect world, would be devoted to any case,
let alone a complex patent case.
Id. at 4–5.
40. See Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667,
1676 (2009) (“[M]ore expert judges, who know more about the field in which they are deciding
cases, are more likely to get decisions right.”); Holderman & Guren, supra note 38, at 5–6
(noting that the Federal Circuit’s high rate of reversal of district court decisions is partially due
to the fact that district court judges are generalists by “trade and training”); see also Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42–43 (1981)
(statement of the Hon. Howard T. Markey, C.J., Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) (“[I]f I
am doing brain surgery every day, day in and day out, chances are very good that I will do your
brain surgery much quicker . . . than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of
years.”).
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Consequently, expertise is most suitable, even necessary, when a
disproportionate amount of judicial resources are required to decide
a particular class of cases because of their heightened complexity.
B. Uniformity and Coherence
Uniformity is critical to ensuring predictability of law, and forum
shopping is the symptom that can diagnose its absence or shortage.
For example, one of the driving forces behind the creation of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was the need for uniformity
41
among circuit courts’ decisions involving patent law. Specifically, the
differing rates at which circuit courts found patents to be valid and
42
infringed led to “rampant” forum shopping. This in turn made it
difficult for lawyers to “counsel technology developers or users” and
created a legal environment that disincentivized investment in
43
research and development.
Although forum shopping is not a concern with habeas
44
petitions, perceptions exist that certain circuits are friendlier than
others to habeas claims brought by state prisoners. For example, the
Ninth Circuit, deemed the most “liberal circuit in the land,” often
receives greater scrutiny by the Supreme Court with respect to habeas
45
claims. The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has been criticized
for its “conservative” approach to habeas claims with some suggesting
that it “artificially depresses the overall success rate” of habeas
46
claims. These perceptions are supported by one analysis which
followed noncapital § 2254 cases from July 1, 2005 to September 30,
2009 as they proceeded from federal district courts through appellate

41. Revesz, supra note 16, at 1116–17.
42. Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
43. Id.
44. Section 2254 petitioners may file in the district in which they were convicted or in which
they are imprisoned. Whatever the choice, for the majority of prisoners, both districts will be in
the same state and thus under a single circuit court’s jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (2012).
45. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Reversals Deliver a Dressing-Down to the Liberal 9th
Circuit, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, at A13 (noting that an “opinion granting habeas” by Judge
Reinhardt, “widely considered to be the nation’s most liberal appeals court judge,” “gets extra
scrutiny”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1, 4–9 (2009) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit is not that liberal considering its restrictive
holding in Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), a habeas case involving
Guantanamo Bay detainees that had arguably stronger statutory and case law support for a
favorable holding for the detainees).
46. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 452 n.92.
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47

courts. It found that there was “substantial variation” in the success
48
rates of habeas petitions among the circuits, from 1.66 percent in the
49
Eleventh Circuit to 22.85 percent in the Sixth Circuit.
Although the federal appellate courts may be as valuable
50
laboratories for experimentation as state courts and legislatures are,
the vast difference between the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits’ success
rates is problematic. This gap cannot be explained by a few different
legal rules, but rather must result from a difference in approach
entirely. This reveals the source of the disuniformity: a lack of
coherence in federal habeas review. Coherence requires a single
51
vision of an area of law. A single vision or purpose guides federal
courts in the development of the law and minimizes the likelihood of
52
contradictory legal interpretations and inconsistent legal rules. One
cause of the disuniformity in the patent system, for example, was a
lack of agreement on whether the courts should “impose[] difficult
53
burdens on patentees, or light ones on infringers.” The Federal
Circuit resolved this split by “articulat[ing] rules that are consistent
54
with the underlying philosophy of patent law.”
Similarly, the values that underlie federal habeas review are
often at cross purposes from one another because the modern system
in fact reflects two competing visions. The first is the Warren Court’s
ideal in which the ultimate goal is fairness; the other is Congress’s
version in which the ultimate goal is finality. Thus, though the
modern system tries to ensure that state-court proceedings are fair
and protect the federal rights of individuals, it counterintuitively
limits the opportunities available to seek collateral review and
correspondingly limits the opportunities available to examine state-

47. Id. at 452 & nn.91–92.
48. Id. at 452 n.92. The authors coded success as instances in which the court of appeals
affirmed a district court decision to grant relief on the merits without remanding for additional
proceedings or reversed a district court decision to deny the same. Id. at 452 n.91.
49. Id. at 452 n.92.
50. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 441 n.215 (2007)
(“Scholars have debated whether or not it is beneficial to allow legal issues to ‘percolate’ in the
lower courts, thereby producing a divergence of approaches which may then inform the
Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution of an issue.”).
51. Revesz, supra note 16, at 1117.
52. See id. (“Coherence . . . demands not only that the legal rules of a statutory scheme be
consistent but also that they reflect a unitary vision of that scheme.”).
53. Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 7.
54. Id. at 8.
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55

court proceedings for unfairness. Whether an individual places
greater value on fairness or finality has been aligned with the liberal–
conservative spectrum; this measurable party-line delineation
underscores the depth of the divide between these competing visions:
Conservatives view habeas corpus as the vehicle that guilty
people use to escape convictions and sentences. They emphasize the
importance of finality and urge limiting the availability of habeas
corpus to those who can make a colorable showing of their
innocence. Liberals see habeas corpus as an essential protection
against individuals being held in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States. They argue that habeas corpus does not
exist solely to free innocents who were wrongfully convicted; it
serves to assure that no person is imprisoned because of an
56
infringement of his or her constitutional rights.

When a particular circuit court’s jurists emphasize one value over
the other, interpretations of the same doctrines or statutory
provisions will differ across circuits and create disuniformity. Petition
outcomes will, accordingly, diverge along the same lines as the
57
different interpretations. For example, one of the most litigated
provisions of AEDPA is § 2254(d)(1) which precludes habeas relief
absent a showing that the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
58
law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” Under Williams v.
59
“unreasonable application” requires an “objectively
Taylor,
60
unreasonable” standard of review. One analysis of twenty-two
Supreme Court decisions between 2000 and 2010 applying the
“unreasonable application” test in capital cases noted that the “liberal
bloc” of justices, composed of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Stevens,
“found the [state courts’] decisions to be an ‘unreasonable
55. See supra Part I.A.1.
56. Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking about Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 750
(1987) (footnotes omitted).
57. See, e.g., Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 189–90 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (describing how concerns about fairness led him to decide in favor of
the petitioner whereas concerns about finality led the majority to decide in favor of the
government).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); see also Daniel J. McGrady, Comment, Whose Line Is It
Anyway?: A Retrospective Study of the Supreme Court’s Split Analysis of § 2254(d)(1) Since
2000, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1599, 1612 n.84 (2011) (reviewing twenty-two Supreme Court
decisions since 2000 that have applied the “unreasonable application” test in a capital context).
59. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
60. Id. at 409.
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application’ of the law 53–64% of the time.” In contrast, the
“conservative bloc,” composed of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist,
Roberts, and Alito, found an unreasonable application of the law in
62
only 4–14 percent of cases. This large disparity suggests these blocs
of the Court have different interpretations of “objectively
unreasonable” that hew to the liberal–conservative divide identified
above: the liberal or fairness-minded Justices are imposing a more
exacting review on the state courts, whereas the conservative or
63
finality-minded Justices are imposing a less stringent review. Thus
the standard of review imposed has less to do with the law than with
the vision held by the justices of the purpose and role of habeas
corpus in the criminal justice system. The lack of coherence therefore
largely leaves the outcome of a particular habeas petition to the luck
of the draw that the majority of the panel assigned to review it are
fairness-minded as opposed to finality-minded.
C. Accuracy
A special concern for accuracy exists in federal habeas review
because the consequences from errors in individual cases are more
broadly harmful than in other areas of law, primarily because these
errors disrupt the conception of courts as guarantors of justice.
The need for accuracy, that the appeals court reaches the right
decision, is two-fold, as it is critical to both its functions: the
64
development of law and the correction of errors in individual cases.
Errors made by circuit courts while performing the first function are
typically only realized years later, when a defect in a legal rule
eventually emerges or the legal rule is modified or overturned by the
Supreme Court.
Errors in individual cases are defined by the Supreme Court as
“erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
65
rule.” Whereas the costs associated with the first kind of error

61. Id. at 1602, 1615–16. This percentage was calculated for each Justice and the range
reflects the different rates at which each Justice found an unreasonable application. Id. at 1616
& n.115.
62. Id. at 1602, 1615–16.
63. See id. at 1602–03, 1615–16 (suggesting that the liberal bloc applies something closer to
a “de novo” standard of review while the conservative bloc applies something closer to “blind
deference”).
64. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 649 (1988).
65. SUP. CT. R. 10.
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impact the public, government, and industries in addition to
66
individual litigants, the costs associated with the second kind are
typically limited to the parties involved. In the habeas context,
however, these errors are more broadly harmful, imposing significant
costs on the prisoner, the legal system, and the public.
At stake in any habeas petition is not property but liberty. The
strongest action the State can take against an individual is to imprison
him. The procedural safeguards in the American criminal justice
system, from the right to an attorney to holding the prosecution to the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof, stand as a testament to
this great power of the State and the need to exercise it judiciously
and accurately. Errors in this context are thus of the kind gravest.
There is a reason the writ of habeas corpus is also known as the
“Great Writ of Liberty”: it is a fundamental safeguard of personal
67
freedom, one that the Framers valued enough to write into the
68
Constitution. Incorrectly denying this relief frustrates the very
purpose of the writ as the wrongful restriction on liberty continues.
This is injustice redoubled; the American legal system has failed this
person, not once, but twice. Moreover, because the Supreme Court
69
rarely grants certiorari to correct such errors, the appellate court’s
70
incorrect decision is typically permanent. As a consequence, the
wrongfully convicted stand to lose decades of their lives.
Additionally, because innocence cases tend to draw public
attention, courts can come under great scrutiny when they decide
71
them. As representatives of the criminal justice system, judges are in

66. See Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative
Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2189 (2014) (describing the costs associated with
changes in constitutional law).
67. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961) (describing the writ as “the highest
safeguard of liberty”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 748.
69. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law.”).
70. Barring, of course, a grant to file a second or successive petition under sections
2244(b)(2)(A) or 2244(b)(2)(B).
71. See, e.g., Lisa Marcus, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction Case, CRIME REPORT (June
30, 2011, 12:38 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/archive/2011-06-anatomy-of-a-wrongfulconviction-case [http://perma.cc/E6HC-ULQG] (describing the defense attorney’s belief that
“widespread press coverage of the case” was partially responsible for the judge’s decision to
hold a hearing).
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a position to restore faith that justice will ultimately prevail.
Erroneously failing to grant relief, however, erodes the public’s
confidence in the criminal justice system just as much as convicting
the innocent or convicting without the guarantees of due process
73
does. If the public is convinced that an innocent man is in prison, it
expects a stampede to justice; the years-long, decades-long delays do
not jive with American society’s understanding of the purposes and
74
workings of the criminal justice system. The errors and subsequent
delays to correct those errors challenge the belief that bureaucracy
belongs to only the other two branches of government.
Finally, none of the four primary values underlying the criminal
justice
system—retribution,
deterrence,
rehabilitation,
and
75
incapacitation —are served when the innocent are wrongfully
convicted and these errors go uncorrected. The wrongfully convicted
individual has done nothing to warrant retribution, nor will he be
deterred, rehabilitated, or incapacitated from future wrongdoing any
more than he was before his conviction. Moreover, when courts
erroneously deny relief to an innocent, they perpetuate the myth that
the guilty person is behind bars. In reality, that person “go[es]

72. See Hans Sherrer, The Complicity of Judges in Wrongful Convictions, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS, Aug. 2004, at 1, 1 (noting that “judges are often thought of by lay people and portrayed
by the news and other broadcast media, as impartial, apolitical men and women who possess
great intelligence, wisdom, and compassion, and are concerned with ensuring that justice
prevails in every case”).
73. Justice for All: Convicting the Guilty and Exonerating the Innocent: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Justice for All Hearing] (statement
of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also Michael Hewlett & Arika
Herron, Federal Court Rejects Kalvin Michael Smith’s Appeal, WINSTON-SALEM J. (July 29,
2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/federal-court-rejects-kalvin-michaelsmith-s-appeal/article_065242e0-f87a-11e2-b981-0019bb30f31a.html
[http://perma.cc/K42RRZLT] (“The Rev. Carlton Eversley of Dellabrook Presbyterian Church called Eagle’s ruling a
‘tragic injustice, another case of an innocent person being railroaded.’”).
74. See Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 4, 2015, 10:40
AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/compensating
-the-wrongly-convicted [http://perma.cc/HAF4-W73Y] (noting that even the wrongfully
convicted who have DNA evidence available to exonerate them spend “on average, more than
14 years behind bars”); see also Carol J. Williams, Relief Delayed for Prisoners Wrongfully
Convicted, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/aug/21/local/la-mejudge-delays-20110822 [http://perma.cc/7KUS-4KUF] (reporting on a judge’s years-long delay
to rule on meritorious habeas petitions and the tragic death of one of the prisoners waiting for
relief).
75. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 21 (7th ed.
2012).
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unpunished, free to murder or rape or rob again.” So not only are
these values not being served with respect to the wrongfully
convicted, they are also not being served with respect to the actually
guilty.
In conclusion, the heightened complexity of federal habeas law
requires expertise to resolve the tension between accuracy and
efficiency; the competing visions of the writ lead to inconsistent legal
principles and disuniformity, where certain judges and courts are
more likely to grant relief than others; and the broadly harmful costs
associated with wrongful convictions and failing to correct them in
collateral proceedings require a special attention to accuracy. These
factors justify specialized review of habeas petitions by a national
court of appeals.
II. A SPECIALIZED COURT
This Part proceeds by first offering some specifics on the form a
specialized court for habeas corpus should take. It then discusses the
benefits and drawbacks of a specialized court and concludes that, due
to the political realities, it is ultimately unlikely that such a court
would ever be created. Part III consequently offers an alternative
mechanism for injecting specialization into federal habeas review.
A. What Should This Specialized Court Look Like?
The specialized court should be a single, national Article III
court of appeals that has complete jurisdiction over all federal habeas
appeals, including capital and noncapital § 2254 and § 2255 petitions,
to the exclusion of other intermediate courts of appeals. It should also
be the only court that is capable of granting certificates of
appealability to second or successive petitions.
This court should have jurisdiction beyond just noncapital § 2254
petitions for two reasons. First, the governing law is largely the same.
Federal prisoners seeking habeas relief file a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 while state prisoners seeking habeas relief in federal courts file
77
78
a motion under § 2254. In Davis v. United States, the Supreme
76. See Marcus, supra note 71 (pointing out that wrongful conviction investigations are “an
attempt to serve law and order” upon those who have escaped punishment, rather than “an
assault by soft-on-crime bleeding hearts”).
77. Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral
Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 95 (2012).
78. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
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Court stated that “§ 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative
79
80
effect.” As a result, most courts read the provisions together and
81
precedents under either “may generally be used interchangeably.”
Though capital cases do raise some additional issues, these are largely
procedural and typically arise at the very beginning and at the very
82
end of the case. Consequently, they stand to benefit just as much
from a specialized forum as noncapital cases do.
Second, in the twelve-month period ending on March 31, 2014,
5406 noncapital § 2254 habeas appeals arising from the federal district
courts were commenced in the federal courts of appeals, accounting
83
for 13.03 percent of all appeals. Including capital § 2254 cases and
capital and noncapital § 2255 cases, this percentage increases to 15.82
84
percent. This relatively minimal increase of 2.79 percent in the
specialized court’s caseload suggests that the benefits of including
85
86
these cases within its jurisdiction outweigh any potential costs.
Additionally, only the specialized court should have authority to
grant a certificate of appealability (COA) to second or successive
petitions. This approach would reduce the likelihood of two
problematic scenarios. The first is one in which a circuit court grants a
COA to a petitioner for a reason that the specialized court later finds
to be incorrect or insufficient under the law. In the second, a circuit
court denies a COA when one should have been granted. In the
former case, there is an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources
by both the circuit court that granted the COA and the district court
that then heard and ruled on the second or successive petition. In the
second case, the specialized court would be unable to hear the second
79. Id. at 344.
80. Russell, supra note 77, at 96.
81. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE
T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 623 (4th ed. 1998).
82. See generally KRISTINE M. FOX, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CAPITAL § 2254 HABEAS CASES:
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2012), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cap2254
hab.pdf/$file/cap2254hab.pdf [http://perma.cc/8AVM-X6UK] (providing an overview of the
issues judges can expect to see in capital § 2254 cases).
83. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS
2014—TABLE B-7 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/9789/download [http://perma.cc/P3VVQQ9J] (reporting 5406 noncapital § 2254 cases). This number does not include second or
successive petitions which are tracked as part of a separate miscellaneous category by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
84. Id. The individual numbers for these appeals are as follows: 982 noncapital § 2255; 7
capital § 2255; 172 capital § 2254. Id.
85. See infra Part II.B.
86. See infra Part II.C.
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or successive petition because under § 2244(b)(3) the decision to
grant or deny a COA to a second or successive petition by a circuit
court cannot be appealed. Therefore, only the specialized court
should have jurisdiction to decide whether a litigant can file a
successive or second habeas petition.
B. The Benefits of a Specialized Court
The factors most strongly justifying specialized review
correspond to its greatest benefits. Complexity requires expertise;
87
that expertise yields accuracy as well as efficiency. Increased
accuracy means a lower likelihood of errors denying meritorious
88
petitioners relief and the costs associated with such errors.
Establishing a specialized court to correct errors in the criminal
justice system would also help restore some of the public’s lost
confidence by serving as a signal to the public that the criminal justice
system, including federal courts, takes wrongful convictions seriously
89
and wants to see these injustices corrected.
This court would also reduce the caseloads of the other courts of
appeals. Although the impact on each circuit will vary depending on
what proportion of its docket consists of habeas appeals, the net
benefit will be that judges—on both the specialized court and the
other courts of appeals—will have more time to consider the cases on
90
their dockets and produce higher quality opinions.
Lastly, judges have expressed frustration with the frivolity of the
91
majority of habeas petitions. Although a single specialized court
would not yield a higher concentration of successful petitions (ones in
which the court of appeals granted or affirmed relief on the merits
outright), it would present an increased number of successful
petitions before a single panel, which could reduce some of this
92
frustration. A hypothetical helps illuminate the point: Assume there

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
See supra note 40.
See, e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 52 (1990) (noting the “oft raised contention that the federal courts are subjected to
unnecessary and overwhelming numbers of successive habeas corpus petitions and evidentiary
hearings in non-death penalty cases brought by state prisoners”); infra text accompanying note
155.
92. Cf. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 452 & nn.91–92 (examining the number of noncapital
§ 2254 cases in which the federal appellate courts granted or affirmed relief on the merits
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are one thousand § 2254 petitions in a given year in the country
spread evenly across the circuits. If only ten of them are successful,
each circuit may see only one of these ten in that year. Moreover, a
particular judge could go many years without presiding over a single
successful petition. But if one specialized court reviewed all one
thousand § 2254 cases, it would also see all ten successful petitions.
And although the concentration of successful petitions overall (1
percent) would not change, the judges on the specialized court would
be more likely to preside over at least one, and possibly more,
successful petitions in a given year. Even if a judge on the specialized
court did not preside over a successful case herself, she would be in
greater proximity to all ten successful decisions that a judge on a
regional circuit court. Closer proximity to successful petitions will
reduce the frustrations engendered by frivolous appeals because the
successful petitions will serve as a reminder of the great stakes and
importance of the work—of courts, of justice—to the petitioner, his
93
family, his community, and the public at large.
C. The Drawbacks of a Specialized Court
Although federal habeas law needs coherence, it is unlikely that
a specialized court would make much headway in achieving this goal.
In the first instance, just as with the current generalized circuit courts,
the makeup of the judicial panels that preside over a particular case in
94
the specialized court will have some impact on the outcome.
A second drawback is that a single court may make it difficult
and expensive for attorneys representing petitioners to investigate
and litigate these claims. Attorneys who represent prisoners are
typically local and either work on a pro bono basis or are court95
appointed. The circuit courts currently have various methods for
appointing qualified attorneys who are familiar with federal habeas
between July 1, 2005 to September 30, 2009 and the “substantial variation” in success rates
among the circuits, from 1.66 percent in the Eleventh Circuit to 22.85 percent in the Sixth
Circuit); infra Part III.C.4.
93. See John Rudolf, LaMonte Armstrong’s Long Road to Freedom After Wrongful
Conviction, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2012, 6:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
07/02/lamonte-armstrong-wrongfully-convicted_n_1644714.html
[http://perma.cc/7V2Y-68Z7]
(reporting the comment of the presiding judge that “freeing Armstrong was likely the ‘closest to
knowing I’m doing justice, in my career, I will ever experience’”).
94. See supra Part I.B.
95. See FOX, supra note 82, at 3–5 (discussing the process for appointing an attorney to a
pro se litigant and the various private and public groups that provide representation on a
volunteer basis).

JINDAL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PROCESS MATTERS

1/27/2016 7:29 AM

1073

review, including having a selection committee, working with the
local federal defender’s office, or maintaining a list of qualified
attorneys. A specialized court, located in one part of the country, will
have limited information about the qualifications of attorneys outside
its geographic location and, consequently, will have trouble
developing a roster of attorneys around the country on whom it can
96
call to provide prisoners with representation. Alternatively, if the
specialized court sources its attorneys from local groups well known
to it, these groups will face considerable expense when they represent
clients located in other states. These attorneys will have limited
ability to investigate the claims because it would require long trips to
find and interview witnesses, explore new investigative avenues, and
collect evidence. This level of expense is unlikely to be sustainable for
the majority of groups privately and publicly funded and could result
in these groups taking on fewer clients. This scenario could even
result in a backlog as the court waits for willing and qualified
attorneys to become available.
Political imbalance provides a third objection—a single court
could come to be dominated by judges who think alike on a particular
area of law and who would transform the court into a tool for
97
enacting radical change in the field. Because of the likelihood that
the judge who values fairness will grant relief in the same case in
98
which a judge who values finality will deny relief, appointing judges
to the specialized court is likely to be difficult. Political actors who
believe that the law should value finality will want to appoint likeminded judges; the same is true for those who value fairness. A long,
drawn-out fight over nominations not only means that the court itself
could become politicized, it also suggests that the long-term goal of
bringing coherence to federal habeas law will be difficult, perhaps
99
even impossible, to achieve.
96. See id. (noting the difficulty of finding qualified attorneys and describing the use of
local groups to source the roster list).
97. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 91, at 11 (noting, with regard to
specialized courts in general, “the danger of political imbalance (e.g., a criminal court
dominated by one end or the other of the spectrum that runs from the extreme ‘law and order’
position to extreme solicitude for the rights of criminal defendants)”).
98. See supra Part I.B.
99. See RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
PROCESS 4–6 (2005) (arguing that “Supreme Court nominations have become public pitched
battles involving partisans, ideological groups, single-issue groups, and the press” and now
increasingly resemble presidential elections); id. at 4, 34–35 (noting the use of “litmus tests” by
presidents and interests groups in identifying acceptable nominees and the criticism that such
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A final drawback is the isolation of specialized courts from other
areas of law. Generalist judges benefit from “the cross-fertilization of
ideas,” which can occur when they “look[] at cases from one field and
realize[] how an earlier decision in which [they] participated from a
100
different field may suggest a creative answer to the problem.”
101
Accordingly, specialization carries the “danger of tunnel vision.”
This danger may be especially great in the habeas context: because
102
the writ’s presence in American law dates back to the Founding,
many of the common-law doctrines applicable to it are also applicable
103
to other areas of law and vice versa.
D. Feasibility
The creation of this specialized court is, unfortunately, unlikely.
Judges may not be willing to agree that a specialized court is needed
104
to hear these cases and Congress, in its current and seemingly
permanent climate of partisan gridlock, is unlikely to come to
agreement over what kind of review is warranted for habeas corpus
105
litigation. Even without these obstacles, the substantial potential for

tests result in the corruption of the nominating process); cf. Eric Black Ink, Something Changed:
Picking a Supreme Court Justice Is Now a Partisan Battle, MINNPOST (Nov. 26, 2012),
https://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2012/11/something-changed-picking-supreme-courtjustice-now-partisan-battle [http://perma.cc/9V6H-RJWS] (arguing that the public controversy
after Roe v. Wade made abortion a focus of Supreme Court nominations but “[l]uckily for Roe
supporters, the new partisan norms of appointments did not take full effect immediately after
the ruling, or Roe would likely have been reversed by now”).
100. Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767
(1997).
101. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 91, at 11.
102. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). There the Court held that
§ 2244(d) “is subject to equitable tolling,” id. at 2560, a conclusion partially based on a previous
decision that a “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a
‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling,’” id. at 2561 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). The Court went on to say that “[i]n the case of
AEDPA, the presumption’s strength is reinforced by the fact that ‘equitable principles’ have
traditionally ‘governed’ the substantive law of habeas corpus, for we will ‘not construe a statute
to displace courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the ‘clearest command.’” Id. (citations
omitted).
104. For example, Judge Lynn Adelman notes, “But, in truth, while some federal courts are
overburdened, most are not, and addressing habeas petitions is not particularly onerous.”
Adelman, supra note 17, at 382.
105. Compare Justice for All Hearing, supra note 73, at 1–3 (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“In the coming weeks, I expect the Judiciary
Committee to take up the reauthorization of the Justice for All Act, which will include . . . new
protections for victims of crime [and] funding for State and local governments for DNA
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politicization of the court and the consequences of a political
imbalance are enough to make this an unattractive option for those
who favor an expanded writ and for those who favor a limited one.
Although the creation of a national court of appeals that hears
only habeas petitions is unlikely, the benefits of specialized review
can still be achieved, and without the above drawbacks, by employing
expert staff attorneys to screen and evaluate habeas claims. This
solution would ensure that judges are in the best position possible
when adjudicating habeas claims. The next Part addresses this form of
specialized review.
III. SPECIALIZED STAFF REVIEW
For the last forty-odd years, federal appellate courts have
employed staff attorneys to keep up with growing caseloads and to
ensure the efficient allocation of scarce judicial resources. This Part
argues that by modifying current practices regarding staff attorneys,
courts can generate even more efficiency and accuracy in adjudicating
habeas corpus claims. After explaining why specialized staff attorneys
should be used to review habeas petitions, this Part details the
appeals courts’ current practices, the problems and inefficiencies
created by these practices, and the modifications needed to refine the
system to achieve the best results. This inquiry demonstrates that
specialization of staff attorneys alleviates most of the concerns raised
by scholars on the circuit courts’ use of staff attorneys.
A. Staff Attorneys and Habeas Corpus
Staff attorneys are unlike judicial law clerks in that they serve the
106
whole court and not an individual judge. Federal appellate courts

testing.”), with id. at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary) (“We do not have the resources at the federal level to provide funding to States
to review every single criminal case after each case has exhausted all appellate remedies, nor
should we interfere with the day-to-day intricacies of State criminal justice.”). Even the idea of
the now-lauded Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was controversial and strongly
objected to by judges and scholars. See, e.g., Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent
Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425 (1951) (arguing against
specialized courts, in particular a specialized court for patent cases).
106. Timothy E. Gammon, The Central Staff Attorneys’ Office in the United States Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit: A Five Year Report, 29 S.D. L. REV. 457, 458 (1984). These clerks are
also different from career chamber clerks, who serve individual judges in their chambers.
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began hiring staff attorneys in the early 1970s. Since then, their
purpose has not changed: staff attorneys help judges manage their
108
caseloads by screening cases for nonargument review and preparing
memorandums and draft dispositions for cases on the nonargument
track. Because judges typically devote less time to cases on the
109
nonargument track, not all cases are suitable for nonargument
review. As Marin Levy identified, there are two categories of cases
best suited for nonargument review: The first includes cases that
“raise issues that the court sees frequently,” as the court’s familiarity
110
reduces the need for oral argument. The second category is
composed of cases “that are least likely to have errors upon arrival at
the appellate courts,” either because they are “patently frivolous” or
because they have already “undergone . . . a meaningful layer of
111
review.” When reviewed by non-expert staff attorneys, habeas cases
do not fully belong to either of these categories.
1. Frequently Arising Issues. Review of habeas petitions typically
follows a pattern of inquiry. Before reaching the merits of a case, the
federal court must be sure that the petition has been properly
112
presented. This entails deciding the following procedural questions
for § 2254 petitions: (1) whether the petitioner is still in state custody;
(2) whether the petition is timely; (3) whether the petition is
successive; and (4) whether the petitioner exhausted all available
113
state remedies for all claims raised. If the court reaches the merits of
the case, it must determine whether the state court decided the claim
107. Id.; see Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1095 (4th Cir. 1972)
(“Two very able young lawyers with prior concentrated academic or practical experience in this
field serve as our habeas clerks and as advocates for the appellants.”).
108. Briefly, cases sorted for nonargument review are decided without oral arguments,
typically on the basis of briefs alone, though they may receive some additional treatment
depending on the circuit. See generally LAURAL HOOPER, DEAN MILETICH & ANGELIA LEVY,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS (2011); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 7.
109. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 416 (“[C]ases that receive less judicial
attention at the outset tend to receive less judicial attention throughout the entire
decisionmaking process.”).
110. Id. at 431–33.
111. Id.
112. At the screening stage, this would include an assessment of jurisdictional defects.
HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 18.
113. FOX, supra note 82, at 6–10. Though Fox’s guide is tailored to the adjudication of
capital habeas cases, “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 apply equally to capital and non-capital
habeas cases.” Id. at 1. The same is true of § 2244(b) (successive petitions) and § 2244(d)
(timeliness). See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
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on the merits. If so, to find that the petitioner should be granted relief
the court must decide either that (a) the petitioner overcame
§ 2254(d)(1) by demonstrating that the state court’s decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or
(b) the petitioner overcame § 2254(d)(2) by demonstrating that the
state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
114
proceeding.” If the state court did not decide the claim on the
merits, then § 2254(d)(1)–(2) are inapplicable and the federal court
conducts de novo review.
At first glance, that the same questions must be answered in a
particular order for each petition suggests that habeas petitions may
indeed belong to this first category of cases, in which the same issues
arise again and again. Answering any one of these questions in
practice, however, is a laborious process. Each one raises sub-issues
and requires knowledge and application of different sources of law
115
and a thorough review of the factual record to resolve them fully.
Moreover, pro se petitions, which comprise more than 90 percent of
116
all noncapital habeas petitions, present additional challenges. Most
are handwritten, prepared without legal assistance, and only partially
complete, requiring staff attorneys to first determine whether such
117
petitions actually even constitute an appeal. The heightened factual
and legal complexity coupled with the challenges related to pro se
appeals means that habeas petitions require a more individualized
inquiry and do not neatly fit into this category.
2. Low Likelihood of Having Errors Upon Arrival at the
Appellate Courts. Habeas appeals also have characteristics that place
them within the second category of cases, in which the likelihood of
error upon arrival at the appellate courts is low. Identifying the
118
“patently frivolous” appeals, such as those “brought by individuals

114. FOX, supra note 82, at 12–14.
115. See supra Part I.A; see also, e.g., FOX, supra note 82, at 9–10 (noting that determining
whether a petitioner has exhausted all state remedies requires “an examination of state postconviction law”).
116. Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Opinion, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8.
117. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A HANDBOOK FOR LAW CLERKS TO
FEDERAL JUDGES 115–16 (Sylvan A. Sobel ed., 2d ed. 2007).
118. Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 432.
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who vent their frustrations in the words of a filed complaint” and
120
those that clearly lack merit, is unlikely to be difficult or prone to
error, especially with the meaningful layer of review provided by the
121
district court.
Meritorious cases, however, present another story. John Blume,
Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir Weyble reported two significant
findings from their “ongoing monitoring of court of appeals
dispositions” in habeas cases: (1) out of 126 cases in which the district
court granted relief on the merits and which the State appealed, “60
were affirmed and 66 were reversed” by the courts of appeals, a
reversal rate of 52.38 percent; (2) “of the 791 district court denials of
relief, 697 were affirmed and 94 were reversed,” a reversal rate of
122
13.49 percent. The high reversal rates suggest that, despite the
meaningful layer of review provided by the district courts, some
habeas petitions still contain errors upon arrival at the appellate
courts. Nonargument review may be inappropriate then because nonexpert staff attorneys may not be able to identify quickly and
accurately the material errors, incorrect applications of law, or novel
123
issues requiring judicial attention. Additionally, any memos or draft
dispositions provided to judges for the purposes of deciding these
cases would be inadequate at best and incorrect at worst.
3. Does Review by Specialized Staff Attorneys Change This
Analysis? If specialized staff attorneys with expert knowledge in
federal habeas law are charged with review of habeas petitions, the
nonargument track becomes more suitable.
Expert knowledge of federal habeas increases both accuracy and
efficiency. One can gain expert status by earning technical degrees or
119. Holderman & Guren, supra note 38, at 4; see, e.g., Sumbry v. Davis, 179 F. App’x 519,
520–21 (10th Cir. 2006) (deciding that an Indiana prisoner’s appeal lacked merit and noting it
was the “third meritless attempt” to file by a “promiscuous as well as a frivolous filer,” who files
petitions and appeals all over the country). The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
reported that a single inmate in an Arizona state prison “filed more than 5,400 petitions in both
the District of Arizona and the Middle District of Tennessee” in the year ending March 31,
2014. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, supra note 16.
120. Sumbry, 179 F. App’x at 521.
121. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 432 (noting that “patently frivolous”
appeals “present issues that are, on their face, so absurd that it is extremely unlikely that a
district court would err in resolving them in the first instance, particularly compared to the
chance of error that exists in nonfrivolous cases”).
122. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 452 & n.91. This is a narrow subset of all the cases
reviewed by the authors.
123. For a review of the efficiency and accuracy benefits of expertise, see supra Part I.A.2.
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credentials or by possessing significant legal experience in the
124
125
particular field. With regard to habeas corpus, there is no LL.M.
126
or special bar exam that can indicate expert knowledge. Thus
experience, gained through constant and prolonged exposure, is not
simply the best way but also the only way to gain status as an expert
on habeas corpus.
Non-expert staff attorneys are generalists, just like the judges
127
they serve. When faced with a new case, both must re-familiarize
themselves with the area of law and the particular issues raised by the
128
case. Constant and prolonged exposure, however, ensures a certain
level of immersion that does not require renewing familiarity. New
knowledge builds on older knowledge, and frequent engagement
129
without interruption minimizes the opportunities to forget.
Immersion also helps with the added challenges of pro se filings. For
example, a staff attorney can learn the most common defects and
130
advise these petitioners on how to correct their filings.
Expert review also ensures that material errors and novel issues
are caught early in the screening process and that the cases are set on
131
the appropriate track. It also allows judges to rely on the knowledge
of specialized staff attorneys and gives them confidence that the staff
attorneys’ briefings and draft opinions offer correct, fully developed

124. See George C. Beighley Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 676
(2011) (listing the problems in patent law necessitating the creation of the Federal Circuit).
125. For example, one can get an LL.M. in tax law. Taxation LL.M., GEORGETOWN LAW,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/graduate-programs/degreeprograms/taxation/ [http://perma.cc/8KN3-UF2C].
126. For example, prior to practicing before the U.S. Patent and Trade Office, individuals
must pass a Registration Examination. See Becoming a Practitioner, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/prct-new/index.jsp [http://perma.cc/
6AV5-HDSX].
127. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 437 (noting that “while pro se prisoner
cases may raise some repeating claims—often about the conditions of imprisonment—the more
general category of pro se appeals includes claims from all areas of law”).
128. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 38, at 4 (reflecting on the diversity of the federal
docket and noting the “challenge of learning or renewing [his] acquaintance with each specific
area of the law in which [he] must become adept to resolve each case”). The adage “use it or
lose it” is also applicable.
129. See supra Part I.A.
130. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 70, 96, 108 (describing the different practices of
the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits in giving “direction” to pro se litigants, including phone
conversations, in-person meetings, and permitting informal briefing).
131. Levy, Judging Justice, supra note 7, at 2410–11 & n.127.
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132

analyses. Because the very purpose of staff attorneys is to ease the
judges’ workload, it is important that judges not feel the need to redo
a staff attorney’s work in every instance. Whereas frequent mistakes
by non-expert staff attorneys will significantly disrupt this
relationship, the rare mistake by the expert staff attorney is unlikely
to do so.
Although screening and developing of habeas cases for
nonargument adjudication is fraught with problems when performed
by non-expert staff attorneys, such practices can materially benefit
judges when performed by expert staff attorneys well versed in
federal habeas law.
B. The Current System
Screening mechanisms developed by the circuit courts vary, but
no court currently has formal positions for staff attorneys specializing
133
in federal habeas review of noncapital state-court convictions.
Although all circuits screen pro se cases for nonargument review as
134
135
an initial matter, with the exception of the Tenth and Second

132. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 331–32, 353 (2011) (describing how in the
Fourth Circuit, where there is some de facto specialization of staff attorneys, “judges may also
decide to request that the case be written up more fully with a memorandum, or even
calendared, though the latter is rarely done”).
133. See generally HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108 (describing the different casemanagement practices at the circuit courts, including the specialized positions that currently
exist in the staff attorney offices). Specifically, the First Circuit has no formal designations, but
its line staff attorneys “may develop informal temporary specialties in new or discrete areas.” Id.
at 62. The Fifth Circuit has two assistant case managers who handle all litigation involving
nondirect, pro se appeals from prisoners and one “generalist/capital case manager” who, in part,
“handles all aspects of death penalty litigation.” Id. at 110. The Sixth Circuit has a death penalty
unit and takes advantage of expertise acquired by staff attorneys in particular areas by assigning
cases “according to their expertise.” Id. at 121. The Ninth Circuit has a “pro se unit.” Id. at 181.
The Tenth Circuit has attorneys that “specialize in screening cases for jurisdictional defects.” Id.
at 189. The Eleventh Circuit has three specialized units organized not by subject matter but by
task: “The Jurisdiction Unit assists the court in the initial review of all appeals filed for the
purpose of determining appellate jurisdiction. The Issue Tracking Unit tracks and catalogs
relevant legal issues. The Motions Unit processes certain substantive motions.” Id. at 203.
The use of specialized death penalty attorneys or units is notable because it suggests
that federal appellate courts already recognize the benefits of specialization in this area of law.
Considering also the overlap between capital and noncapital habeas corpus, see supra notes 77–
82 and accompanying text, creating positions for staff attorneys who specialize in noncapital
habeas corpus is highly feasible. Some courts may not even require new hiring, but only
reorganizing of current staff.
134. Id. at 51, 64, 89, 101, 111, 122, 137, 152, 181, 204–05 (describing the screening of pro se
cases by the circuit courts).
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Circuits, pro se appeals cover a wide spectrum of law and provide
138
little chance for specialization in habeas review. Each circuit should
create, at minimum, one formal position for an expert staff attorney
who specializes in habeas corpus. Courts with smaller caseloads could
use this staff attorney’s expertise in both capital and noncapital
139
habeas cases. If the court’s workload is large enough to justify both
a noncapital and capital habeas attorney, it should have both.
Federal appellate courts also currently employ supervisory staff
attorneys as career attorneys whereas “line staff attorneys” typically
140
serve two- to three-year terms. When staff attorneys opt to stay
longer, some circuits expressly limit the number of years they can
141
serve. The problem with short-term employment is that the first
year is spent scaling the learning curve so that courts end up serving
142
as mere training grounds for these attorneys. This means that courts
reap for only a little while the benefits from the training provided to
these attorneys and the expertise gained from their experience. The
specialized staff attorney position, therefore, should be a career
position as that will ensure that courts retain the benefits of
experience and expertise gained over time.

135. The Tenth Circuit’s judges form screening panels and most pro se cases are decided by
those panels or routed for argument or nonargument review. Id. at 198.
136. The Second Circuit only screens pro se prisoner appeals for nonargument. If the pro se
appeal survives initial review, it is placed on the argument panel’s calendar unless the litigant is
incarcerated. Id. at 75.
137. See supra note 127.
138. Although the majority of pro se appeals are prisoners’ petitions, HOOPER ET AL., supra
note 108, at 38, this is a very broad category covering capital and noncapital habeas corpus,
motions to vacate sentences, civil rights and prison condition claims, and others. See supra note
83 (breaking down the composition of “prisoner petitions” arising from federal district courts).
139. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
140. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 12. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have changed
this practice recently to permit career positions to be offered to “specific” line staff attorneys.
Id.
141. Id. at 12 n.9 (“For example . . . the Ninth Circuit has a five-year limit.”).
142. See Elizabeth Olson, Corporations Drive Drop in Law Firms’ Use of Starting Lawyers,
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 10, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2014/10/10/corporations-drive-drop-in-law-firms-use-of-starting-lawyers-study-finds [http://
perma.cc/KX22-BKM7] (reporting that corporations are foregoing the services of entry-level
lawyers who cost less but bill more time than senior-level associates with greater experience).
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C. Concerns About the Use of Staff Attorneys
Scholars have heavily criticized the use of staff attorneys and
143
other case-management practices. The criticisms surrounding staff
attorneys are that they (1) lack the requisite experience to do the
144
job, (2) are unlikely to possess the “paradigmatically elite academic
145
qualifications” of chamber clerks, (3) are “dissatisfied with the tasks
146
assigned them,” and (4) “share the court’s frustration and distaste
147
for” the “unmeritorious appeals” of “indigent prisoners.” These
arguments lack force, however, when the staff attorney position is a
career post for a staff attorney with an expertise in habeas corpus.
1. Inexperience. When term-limited line staff attorneys are
responsible for reviewing all noncapital habeas corpus claims, their
inexperience and lack of expertise risks generating inefficiency and
148
error. The constant turnover ensures that the position is more often
inhabited by someone with inexperience rather than experience. By
changing just one of these term-limited positions into a permanent
post, courts and litigants alike can benefit from the expertise staff
attorneys will gain through immersion in habeas corpus.
2. Elite Qualifications and Job Satisfaction. Many jobs are
capable of fulfilling basic needs, such as offering job stability and
guaranteeing a safe work environment and fair work practices. But
few are capable of fulfilling higher-order needs, such as offering
prestigious job assignments, job titles that reflect status and expertise,
149
and challenging work. Better-qualified candidates will have their

143. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 420 (providing an overview of the
scholarly response to case-management practices).
144. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1492.
145. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys
Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 27 (2007). Chamber clerks are hired by judges
individually to assist only them and typically for a one- to two-year period.
146. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1492.
147. Id. at 1462. A final criticism of the practice arises from the concern that judges will
come to rely too heavily on staff attorneys and fail to check for errors in staff attorney work
product. Id. at 1492. Even should this happen, the likelihood of errors in work product prepared
by expert staff attorneys can be assumed to be lower than the likelihood of errors in work
product prepared by non-expert staff attorneys. See supra Part III.A.3.
148. See supra Parts III.A.1–2.
149. See Robert Tanner, Motivation—Applying Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory,
MANAGEMENT IS A JOURNEY, https://managementisajourney.com/motivation-applyingmaslows-hierarchy-of-needs-theory [http://perma.cc/R3H9-MCYK] (discussing psychologist
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pick of jobs that satisfy basic needs and, consequently, will be
150
attracted to jobs that can satisfy their higher-order needs as well.
Although it is unlikely that a career position with a court will draw
the elite young lawyers who serve judges in their chambers, a
specialized and permanent position offers job security, as well as the
prestige associated with identification as an “expert” in a particular
area of law. Thus, it is more likely to draw better-qualified candidates
than a term-limited line staff attorney position.
Moreover, term-limited line staff attorneys perform the most
frustrating tasks like searching for jurisdictional defects and drafting
151
summary dispositions for patently frivolous appeals. Specialized
staff attorneys, on the other hand, would handle more complex
appeals as they will be able to efficiently and accurately identify
material errors or novel issues and prepare memos or draft
152
dispositions for cases in which familiar, but difficult, issues arise. As
specialized staff attorneys gain in experience, they will be charged
with greater responsibilities which will increase their job
153
satisfaction.
3. Frustration and Distaste for Unmeritorious Appeals. Judges
are concerned about the significant consumption of scarce judicial
154
resources that attends adjudication of frivolous appeals. Justice
Jackson best explained this frustration: “It must prejudice the
occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless
ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up
155
with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.” Although
this comment could be applied generally, Justice Jackson was
referring to habeas petitions specifically. Considering the low rate at
Abraham Maslow’s theory that humans are driven to satisfy five basic needs and applying the
theory to the employment context).
150. See id. (arguing that “[w]ith [basic] needs satisfied, an employee will want his higher
level needs of esteem and self-actualization met”).
151. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1492.
152. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 62 (describing the First Circuit’s practice of
assigning “difficult circumstances and emergencies” to the “most experienced [staff]
attorneys”); supra Part III.A.3.
153. See N.K. JAIN, 2 ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 565 (2005) (listing “mentally
challenging work” as one of the “more important factors conductive [sic] to job satisfaction”).
154. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 438 (“Given the courts’ perception of pro
se appeals, the nonargument treatment of these cases can be understood as part of a larger
attempt to allocate less judicial attention to classes of cases that are thought to have a higher
percentage of frivolous claims.”).
155. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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156

which federal courts grant habeas relief today, it is no surprise that
this frustration continues. The judges’ delegation of this work to staff
attorneys raises the concern that staff attorneys will only come to
157
share in this frustration.
The rising rate of exonerations suggests that this may be fast
becoming an outdated concern, if it is not one already. In particular, a
fundamental shift has occurred since 1953 when Justice Jackson
voiced his concern: it is no longer a question of if there is a needle,
but how many. Since the first use of DNA to exonerate an innocent in
158
1989 and the founding of the Innocence Project in 1992 by Barry
159
Scheck and Peter Neufeld, it has become imprinted in the public
consciousness that the criminal justice system does not always work,
160
that it in fact fails some people spectacularly.
Demonstrating this shift is the increase in the number of public
and private organizations committed to uncovering wrongful
convictions. These include wrongful conviction clinics working out of
law schools, local branches of the Innocence Project, state
commissions and agencies, such as the Florida Innocence Commission
and the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, and a host of
161
media allies. As more organizations litigate or expose claims of
156. Looking at a sample size of over 2000 cases, a study found that only 0.8 percent of
noncapital habeas corpus claims are granted after appellate review. Nancy J. King, Non-Capital
Habeas Cases After Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308, 310
(2012).
157. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1462 (articulating this concern).
158. Fact Sheets – DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php
[http://perma.cc/KX22BKM7].
159. About the Innocence Project, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
about [http://perma.cc/J2DW-GSPE].
160. Adam Serwer, Americans Think the Criminal Justice System is Racist, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Sept. 23, 2014, 12:34 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/adamserwer/blacks-whites-criminaljustice-survey#.hg7Q1j5Kgr [http://perma.cc/5PJ2-NF8P]; Browse Cases – Detailed View, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.
aspx [http://perma.cc/NZ77-JXTZ].
161. See Innocence Network Member Organizations, INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://
innocencenetwork.org/members [https://perma.cc/DM43-GZVN] (listing members in all fifty
states, including law-school clinics); Criminal Justice Reform Commissions: Case Studies,
INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 1, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-eventsexonerations/criminal-justice-reform-commissions-case-studies [https://perma.cc/4QQ8-L25M]
(listing various commissions and agencies set up by state legislatures and courts to inquire or act
on wrongful convictions). Consider also the ten years spent by the documentarians of Making a
Murderer to report on Steven Avery’s case, Over 10 Years, 2 Filmmakers Documented the
‘Making’ of a Murderer, NPR (Jan. 12, 2016, 2:54 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/05/
461908092/over-10-years-two-filmmakers-documented-the-making-a-murderer [https://perma.
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innocence, and on a wider basis than just DNA-based exonerations, it
is likely that courts and staff attorneys will also start to see a
corresponding uptick in meritorious claims.
One new addition to this list of organizations underscores the
fundamental pivot that Americans have made in their conceptions
about wrongful convictions: the establishment of Conviction Integrity
Units (CIUs) in district attorneys’ offices. Prosecutors and law
enforcement have long maintained an attitude of outright denial or
162
refusal to even consider innocence. But in 2006, the District
Attorney for Dallas County, Craig Watkins, set up the nation’s first
163
Conviction Integrity Unit. Its purpose? Review past convictions and
164
identify wrongful convictions of the actually innocent. In its first
four years, the Unit reviewed 300 cases “and led to the exoneration of
165
25 wrongfully convicted prisoners.” During the past few years, more
166
prosecutors’ offices around the country have established these units,
167
and they are looking for more than just DNA-based exonerations.
These units demonstrate a marked change in how prosecutors
perceive wrongful convictions, not only accepting that miscarriages of
justice may have occurred, but actively seeking them out to correct
them.

cc/QX8W-2CAM], or the year spent by the producers of the podcast Serial to investigate Adnan
Syed’s case, Serial: Ep. 01 – The Alibi (Oct. 3, 2014), https://serialpodcast.org/season-one
[https://perma.cc/8CNC-D67V].
162. See Sue Russell, Why Can’t Law Enforcement Admit Their Mistakes?, SALON (Oct. 21,
2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/21/why_cant_law_enforcement_admit_their_
mistakes [http://perma.cc/FHQ8-5E7A] (describing prosecutors’ and law enforcement officials’
refusal to let go of “their long-held certainty about a suspect’s guilt” even when presented with
significant evidence to the contrary).
163. Justice for All Hearing, supra note 73, at 4.
164. Id. ‘Actually innocent’ cases are a subset of wrongful convictions in which evidence
conclusively establishes that the convicted person did not commit the crime. They do not
include, for example, cases where the evidence was ultimately found to be insufficient to
support a conviction, but neither did it prove innocence. See infra note 167.
165. Id.
166. CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS: VANGUARD OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2–5 (2014) (discussing the sixteen CIUs currently established in
district attorneys’ offices around the country).
167. See Matthew McKnight, No Justice, No Peace, NEW YORKER (Jan. 6, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kenneth-thompson-conviction-review-unit-brooklyn
[http://perma.cc/45VS-KR3L] (“‘They’re not simply looking at wrongful convictions in cases in
which a person can prove his or her innocence. They’re also looking at cases where they may be
innocent—we don’t know—but, definitely, the conviction has no integrity,’ Peter Neufeld, the
cofounder of the Innocence Project, told me.”).
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But even a single exoneration is enough for some to know that
the work is worthwhile. In 2012, North Carolina Superior Court
Judge Joe Turner oversaw the release of LaMonte Armstrong, who
had spent nearly seventeen years in jail for a murder he did not
commit. At the hearing, Judge Turner said that freeing Armstrong
was the “closest to knowing I’m doing justice, in my career, I will ever
168
experience.”
CONCLUSION
Habeas petitioners and federal courts of appeals both stand to
gain significant benefits from the specialized review of habeas claims.
These benefits include accuracy, efficiency, correcting injustice and
restoring liberty, and renewing public confidence in the criminal
justice system. The creation of a specialized court of appeals would
require congressional leadership and approval, which is unlikely in
light of the competing visions for the scope of federal habeas review.
Review by specialized staff attorneys, however, is an option that
courts can implement today with little additional cost. Not only would
such review increase the efficiency of the courts’ handling of
noncapital § 2254 claims, it would also promote accuracy in
identification of novel issues and material errors. Moreover,
specialization among staff attorneys minimizes or eliminates many of
the criticisms lobbed at appellate courts’ use of them.
The minimal changes recommended in this Note—establishing at
least one formal post for a staff attorney who will be responsible for
primarily reviewing noncapital § 2254 claims, and turning it into a
career position as opposed to a two- to three-year term-limited
position—could have a strong positive impact on the likelihood that
wrongfully convicted prisoners will see justice. At any rate, these
changes will ensure that courts give habeas petitions the due care and
attention they require.

168. See supra note 93.

